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 lot has been made of the recent appointment of Lucas Papademos and Mario Monti 
as Prime Ministers in pectore of their respective countries. 
In particular, the public debate has focused on their status as unelected officials who 
allegedly constitute a break of the democratic continuum. 
It can actually be argued however that, even though they are technocrats, their democratic 
credentials are even stronger than those of the politicians they have been called to replace, 
given that they are expected to lead governments of national unity. Indeed, in these 
countries today, only grand coalitions can provide the necessary legitimacy to push 
through the tough reforms that are on the agenda.  
Both countries are in a very grave situation, requiring extremely determined action and 
hard measures, but both suffer from a highly fragmented and confrontational political 
system, where infighting between and within the main parties can and has led to paralysis. 
Given the level of political fighting, no representative of either of the political fronts 
(centre-left and centre-right) would be acceptable to the other. Papandreou could not have 
led a national unity government because Néa Dimokratia would not have supported him, 
and Berlusconi could certainly not have led a national unity government because the 
Partito Democratico would never have supported him. Hence, the need for technocrats to 
come to the rescue. 
As for the citizens, who on this occasion are denied the right to don their voters’ hat, one 
should not be too quick in assuming that they will take the appointments negatively. To 
begin with, in both countries the constant squabbling and inability to take decisive action 
has led to a disillusionment (if not outright disdain) with politicians, who are perceived as 
grossly overpaid, perks-seeking members of a privileged caste.  
The answer to the question about the popular support for the governments that are being 
formed will thus depend on relative importance one attaches to the dichotomy input-
legitimacy/output legitimacy. That is, are citizens more interested in having a say about 
their government (and the actions that it should take) through elections, or are they more 
interested in having a government that actually delivers results (and improves the situation 
of the country? Empirical evidence seems to point in the direction of a positive reaction to 
the appointments: the first snap-polls indicate that 50% of the Italians favour Monti, and 
58% would support his government. In the eyes of many Greeks and Italians, the two soft-
spoken professors are untainted by political affiliation and are perceived as competent 
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individuals who will be guided in their action by their respective country’s interest, rather 
than that of their party. 
Moreover, the deterioration of the two countries’ economic situation has been so rapid (for 
Italy, a matter of two weeks), that most voters probably realise that, even though an 
election would have been desirable, it would have taken so long to organise that the 
countries would have defaulted twice over in the meantime. It takes months to organise an 
election, while in the current circumstances it only takes weeks (or a few days) for a 
country to go under. 
Finally, a few eyebrows are raised because the nominations of Messrs Papademos and 
Monti seem to “let the markets decide instead of the people” and because of their 
(excessive) closeness to EU leaders.  
With regard to the first argument, it is useful to bear in mind that the citizens and their 
elected representatives would have had more options to choose from had they started from 
a better socio-economic position. Greece and Italy must now accede to the indications of 
their creditors because they have too large a debt in the first place. Had they respected (or 
adhered more closely to) the Maastricht criteria (that they voluntarily ratified), their 
position would not have been so close to the edge today. It was the Greeks and the Italians 
who rubberstamped, through their behaviour at the polls, the policies and practices that 
led them to the brink. 
The fact that Monti and Papademos are close to EU circles is of course not a surprise or a 
coincidence; it is rather a sad reflection of the populist drift in these countries that one 
should even think of holding this against them. This is true for two reasons: First the 
officials who have a high-level European career are normally the best of their crop: they 
typically are the ones that transcend the national borders to get involved in policy-making 
at the continental level. So it is only natural that their respective countries should resort to 
their talent, making the best use of the human capital represented by these highly qualified 
civil servants in a time of duress. 
European technocrats are an appropriate choice for these jobs, secondly, because this is a 
European crisis that affects the eurozone in its entirety, and part of it has to do with trust. 
In the European economy as a whole, there is actually enough money around to survive the 
crisis, but the northern investors no longer believe that they can trust the potential 
borrowers from the south. Changing this state of affairs also requires appointing 
interlocutors who are credible in the eyes of their European partners, a credibility that to 
an extent depends on past records. Familiarity with fellow decision-makers is a definite 
plus. The choice of these personalities is thus in itself part of the measures, together with 
the reforms that they are called to implement.  
And here we come to the core of the problem. For all the injections of goodwill, 
honeymoon effects and the glittery eyes that the sole mention of their two names will 
produce, the record of Profs Papademos and Monti will be measured by how much they 
will be able to deliver. It is not difficult to predict the solutions they are likely to propose; 
the key question is whether they will be able to put them into practice. This in turn will 
depend to a large extent on the room for manoeuvre that the political actors that underpin 
their legitimacy will extend to them. While this is further evidence that the developments 
in Greece and Italy are well within the boundaries of democracy, one only has to hope that 
the main parties in the two countries have learnt their lesson and are prepared to put aside 
their mutual acrimony and rally behind the technocrats’ flag to help put their states back 
on track. That in itself would be a huge achievement with long-term consequences. 